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Abstract
Contact tracing is an essential tool for pub-
lic health officials and local communities to
fight the spread of novel diseases, such as for
the COVID-19 pandemic. The Singaporean
government just released a mobile phone app,
TraceTogether, that is designed to assist health
officials in tracking down exposures after an in-
fected individual is identified. However, there
are important privacy implications of the exis-
tence of such tracking apps. Here, we analyze
some of those implications and discuss ways
of ameliorating the privacy concerns without
decreasing usefulness to public health. We
hope in writing this document to ensure that
privacy is a central feature of conversations
surrounding mobile contact tracing apps and to
encourage community efforts to develop alter-
native effective solutions with stronger privacy
protection for the users. Importantly, though
we discuss potential modifications, this docu-
ment is not meant as a formal research paper,
but instead is a response to some of the privacy
characteristics of direct contact tracing apps
like TraceTogether and an early-stage Request
for Comments to the community.
Date written: 2020-03-24
Minor correction: 2020-03-30
1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has spread like wildfire
across the globe [1]. Very few countries have man-
aged to keep it well-controlled, but one of the key
tools that several such countries use is contact trac-
ing [2]. More specifically, whenever an individual
is diagnosed with the coronavirus, every person
who had possibly been near that infected individual
during the period in which they were contagious
is contacted and told to self-quarantine for two
weeks [3]. In the early days of the virus, when
∗Authors listed alphabetically.
there were only a few cases, contact tracing could
be done manually. With hundreds to thousands of
cases surfacing in some cities, contact tracing has
become much more difficult [4].
Countries have been employing a variety of
means to enable contact tracing. In Israel, legisla-
tion was passed to allow the government to track
the mobile-phone data of people with suspected
infection [5]. In South Korea, the government has
maintained a public database of known patients,
including information about their age, gender, oc-
cupation, and travel routes [6]. In Taiwan, medical
institutions were given access to patients travel his-
tories [7], and authorities track phone location data
for anyone under quarantine [8]. And on March
20, 2020, Singapore released an app that tracks
via Bluetooth when two app users have been in
close proximity: when a person reports they have
been diagnosed with COVID-19, the app allows the
Ministry of Health to determine anyone logged to
be near them; a human contact tracer can then call
those contacts and determine appropriate follow-up
actions.
Solutions that have worked for some countries
may not work well in other countries with differ-
ent societal norms. We believe that in the United
States, in particular, the aforementioned measures
are unlikely to be widely adopted. On the legal side,
publicly revealing patients’ protected health infor-
mation (PHI) is a violation of the federal HIPAA
Privacy Rule [9], and the Fourth Amendment bars
the government from requesting phone data with-
out cause [10]. Some of these norms may be sus-
pended during times of crisis—HIPAA has recently
been relaxed via enforcement discretion during the
crisis to allow for telemedicine [11], and a pub-
lic health emergency could well be argued to be a
valid cause [12]. However, many Americans are
wary of sharing location and/or contact data with
tech companies or the government, and any privacy
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concerns could slow adoption of the system [13].
Singapore’s approach of an app, which gives in-
dividuals more control over the process, is perhaps
the most promising solution for the United States.
However, while Singapore’s TraceTogether app
protects the privacy of users from each other, it has
serious privacy concerns with respect to the gov-
ernment’s access to the data. In this document, we
discuss these privacy issues in more detail and intro-
duce approaches for building a contact tracing ap-
plication with enhanced privacy guarantees, as well
as strategies for encouraging rapid and widespread
adoption of this system. We do not make explicit
recommendations about how one should build a
privacy-preserving contact tracing app, as any de-
sign implementation should first be carefully vetted
by security, privacy, legal, ethics, and public health
experts. However, we hope to show that there exist
options for preserving several different notions of
user privacy while still fully serving public health
aims through contact tracing apps.
2 Singapore’s TraceTogether App
On March 20, 2020, the Singaporean Ministry of
Health released the TraceTogether app for Android
and iOS [14]. It operates by exchanging tokens
between nearby phones via a Bluetooth connec-
tion. The tokens are also sent to a central server.
These tokens are time-varying random strings, as-
sociated with an individual for some amount of
time before they are refreshed. Should an indi-
vidual be diagnosed with COVID-19, the health
officials will ask* them to release their data on the
app, which includes a list of all the tokens the app
has received from nearby phones. Because the gov-
ernment keeps a database linking tokens to phone
numbers and identities, it can resolve this list of
tokens to the users who may have been exposed.
By using time-varying tokens, the app does keep
the users private from each other. A user has no
way of knowing who the tokens stored in their app
belong to, except by linking them to the time the
token was received. However, the app provides
little to no privacy for infected individuals; after
an infected individual is compelled to release their
data, the Singaporean government can build a list
of all the other people they have been in contact
with. We will formalize these several notions of
privacy in Section 3.
*While the health officials ask, it is a crime in Singa-
pore not to assist the Ministry of Health in mapping one’s
movements, so ‘ask’ is a bit of a misnomer [15].
3 Desirable Notions of Privacy
Here, we discuss three notions of privacy that are
relevant to our analysis of contact-tracing systems:
(1) privacy from snoopers, (2) privacy from con-
tacts, and (3) privacy from the authorities. Note
that in this document, we do not rigorously define
what it means for information to be private, as this
is a topic better left for future works; some popular
definitions include information theoretic privacy
[16], k-anonymity [17], and differential privacy
[18]. Furthermore, we discuss only these three
notions of privacy to illustrate some of the short-
comings of direct contact-tracing systems. Other
recent work has presented a useful taxonomy of the
risks and challenges of contact tracing apps [19].
For any contact tracing app that achieves the aim
of telling individuals that they might have been
exposed to the virus, there is clearly some amount
of information that has to be revealed. Even if
the only information provided is a binary yes/no
to exposure, a simple linkage attack [20] can be
performed: if the individual was only near to one
person in the last two weeks, then there will be
an obvious inference about the infection status of
that person. The goal is of course to reduce the
amount of information that can be inferred by each
of the three parties (snoopers, contacts, and the
authorities) while still achieving the public health
goal of informing people of potential exposures to
help slow the spread of the disease.
Of note, here we use a semi-honest model for
privacy [21], where we do not consider the pos-
sibility of malicious actors polluting the database
or sending malformed queries, but rather instead
just analyze the privacy loss from the information
revealed to each party. A nefarious actor could,
for example, falsely claim to be infected to spread
panic; this is not a privacy violation, though we do
consider this further in the Discussion. Alternately,
when a server exposes a public API, queries can be
crafted to reveal more information than intended
by the system design, which is indeed a privacy
violation. We leave a more thorough analysis of
safeguards for the malicious model to future work.
3.1 Privacy from Snoopers
Consider the most naı¨ve system for contact trac-
ing, which no reasonable privacy-conscious society
would ever use, where the app simply broadcasts
the name and phone number of the phone’s owner,
and nearby phones log this information. Then,
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upon diagnosis of COVID-19, the government pub-
lishes a public list of those infected, which the app
then checks against its list of known recent contacts.
This is clearly problematic as a nefarious passive
actor (a ‘snooper’) could track the identities of peo-
ple walking past them on the street.
A slightly more reasonable system would as-
sign a unique user-ID to each individual, which
is instead broadcast out. This does not have quite
as many immediate security implications, though
all it would take is a nefarious actor linking each
ID to a user before one runs into the same prob-
lem, which is known as a ‘linkage attack.’ Given
how easy and common linkage attacks are, this ap-
proach also provides insufficient levels of privacy
for users [22; 23].
The Singaporean app TraceTogether does better,
in that it instead broadcasts random time-varying
tokens as temporary IDs. Because these tokens
are random and change over time, someone scan-
ning the tokens while walking down the street will
not be able to track specific users across different
time points, as their tokens are constantly refreshed.
Note that the length of time before refreshing a to-
ken is an important parameter of the system (too
infrequent and users can still be tracked, too fre-
quent and the amount of tokens that need to be
stored by the server could be huge), but with a rea-
sonable refresh rate, the users are largely protected
against attacks by snoopers in public spaces.
3.2 Privacy from Contacts
Here, the term contact is defined as any individ-
ual with whom a user has exchanged tokens in the
contact tracing app based on some notion of phys-
ical proximity. Privacy from contacts is harder to
achieve, because the information that needs to be
passed along is whether one of the individual’s con-
tacts has been diagnosed with COVID-19, so some
information has to be revealed.
The TraceTogether app gives privacy from con-
tacts by instead putting trust in government authori-
ties. When TraceTogether alerts a contact that they
have been exposed to COVID-19, the information
comes directly from the Singaporean Ministry of
Health, and no additional information is shared (to
our knowledge) that could identify the individual
that was diagnosed. Thus, TraceTogether does pro-
tect users’ privacy from each other, except for what
can be inferred based on the user’s full list of con-
tacts, as the only information that is revealed to
the user is a binary exposure indicator, which is ar-
guably the minimum possible information release
for the system to be useful.
3.3 Privacy from the Authorities
Protecting the privacy of the users from the au-
thorities, i.e. whoever is administering the app,
whether that is a government agency or a large
tech company, is also a challenging task. Clearly,
in the absence of a fully decentralized peer-to-peer
system, any information sharing among phones
with the app installed will have to be mediated by
some coordinating servers. Without any protective
measures (e.g. based on cryptography), the coordi-
nating servers are given an inordinate amount of
knowledge.
TraceTogether does not privilege this type of pri-
vacy, instead making use of relatively high trust
in the government in its design. While it does not
deliberately gather more information than neces-
sary to build a contact map—for example, it does
not use GPS location information, as Bluetooth
is sufficient for finding contacts—it also does not
try to hide anything from the Singaporean govern-
ment. When a user is diagnosed with COVID-19
and gives their list of tokens to the Ministry of
Health, the government can retrieve the mobile
numbers of all individuals that user has been in
contact with. Thus, neither the diagnosed user, nor
the exposed contacts, have any privacy from the
government.
Furthermore, because the government maintains
a database linking together time-varying tokens
with mobile numbers, they can also, in theory, track
people’s activities without GPS simply by placing
Bluetooth receivers in public places. There is no
reason to disbelieve the TraceTogether team when
they state that they do not attempt to track people’s
movements directly; however, the data they have
could be employed to do so. Citizens of countries
such as the U.S. trust authorities much less than
Singaporeans [24], so the privacy trade-offs that
Singaporeans are willing to make may not be the
same ones that Americans will accept.
4 Privacy-Enhancing Augmentations to
the TraceTogether System
Here, we discuss potential approaches to build
upon the TraceTogether model to obtain a con-
tact tracing system with differing privacy char-
acteristics for the users. Though important and
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Table 1: Comparison of contact tracing systems discussed in this document with respect to privacy of
the users in the semi-honest model and required computational infrastructure.
Privacy
from
snoopers
Privacy from contacts Privacy from authorities Infrastructure
requirementsExposed
user Diagnosed user Exposed user Diagnosed user
Trace To-
gether [14] Yes Yes Yes
No. Exposure
status and all tokens
revealed.
No. Infection status,
all tokens, and all
contact tokens
revealed.
Minimal
Polling-
based*
(§4.1)
Yes Yes Yes† Partial. Susceptibleto linkage attacks.
Partial. Susceptible
to linkage attacks.
Low. Single
server.
Polling-
based with
mixing
(§4.3)
Yes Yes Yes†
Almost private.
Protects against
linkage attacks by
mixing tokens from
different users.
Almost private.
Protects against
linkage attacks by
mixing tokens from
different users.
Medium.
Multiple
servers for
mixing.
Public
database
(§4.4)
Yes Yes
Partial. Info
leaked at time
of token
exchange.
Yes Partial. Susceptibleto linkage attacks.
Communica-
tion cost to
phones is
high.
Private
messaging
system
(§5)
Yes Yes
Partial. Info
leaked at time
of token
exchange. ‡
Yes Yes
High.
Multiple
servers
performing
crypto.
* Augmenting with random tokens does not improve privacy.
† However, if contacts are malicious, and they send malformed queries (e.g. a query that includes only a single token),
the diagnosed individual only has the same privacy level as in the public database solution. Namely, there’s only partial
privacy because information is leaked through knowing the time of token exchange.
‡ This information leakage might be fixable using data aggregation based on multi-key homomorphic encryption, but we
do not do so here.
highly nontrivial, various technical and engineer-
ing challenges behind the exchange of Bluetooth
tokens [25] are outside the scope of this document.
Our abstraction is that there exists some mecha-
nism for nearby phones to exchange short tokens if
the devices come within 6 feet of each other—the
estimated radius within which viral transmission
is a considerable risk [26]. We are primarily con-
cerned with the construction of those tokens, and
how those tokens can be used to perform contact
tracing in a privacy-preserving manner.
First, we formally describe the TraceTogether
system. Let Alice and Bob be users of the app, and
let Grace be the government server (or other cen-
tral authority). Alice generates a series of random
tokens A = {a0, a1, . . .}, one for each time inter-
val, and Bob generates a similar series of tokens
B = {b0, b1, . . .}, all drawn randomly from some
space {0, 1}N . They also both report their list of
tokens A and B, as well as their phone numbers
to Grace. At a time t, Alice and Bob encounter
each other, exchanging at and bt. Alice and Bob
keep lists of contact tokens Aˆ = {aˆ0, aˆ1, . . .} and
Bˆ = {bˆ0, bˆ1, . . .} respectively. These consist of
tokens from every person they were exposed to;
i.e. bt ∈ Aˆ and at ∈ Bˆ because Alice and Bob
exchanged tokens at time t. Five days later, Bob
is diagnosed with COVID-19, and sends his list
of contact tokens Bˆ, which includes at, to Grace.
Grace then matches each bˆi to a phone number,
reaches out to those individuals, including Alice,
and advises them to quarantine themselves because
they may have been exposed to the virus.
4.1 Partially Anonymizing via Polling
Instead of having Grace reach out to Alice when
Bob reports that he has been diagnosed, a more
privacy-conscious alternative is for Alice to “poll”
Grace on a regular basis. In this setting, Grace
maintains the full database, and Alice asks Grace
if she has been exposed. This alternative does not
require Alice and Bob to send their phone numbers
to Grace. In this setting, there are two reporting
choices for when Bob wishes to declare his diag-
nosis of COVID-19. Bob can send his own tokens
B to Grace, or he can send the contact tokens Bˆ
to Grace. In the former case, Alice needs to send
Grace her contact tokens Aˆ to see if any have been
diagnosed with COVID-19. In the latter case, Alice
needs to send Grace her own tokens A to ask if any
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of them have been published. Either way, Grace
is able to inform Alice that she has been exposed,
without revealing Bob’s identity. This presupposes
that Alice is Honest but Curious (semi-honest); if
Alice is malicious and crafts a malformed query
containing only the token she exchanged with Bob,
she may be able to reveal Bob’s identity.
Note that in either version of this system, indi-
viduals still have privacy from snoopers and from
contacts. However, they additionally gain some
amount of privacy from authority, as Grace does
not have their mobile numbers. Of course, Grace
does have some ability to perform linkage attacks.
If Bob publishes to Grace his own tokens B upon
being diagnosed, and Alice queries Grace with all
her contact tokens Aˆ, then Grace can attempt to link
those sets of tokens to individuals or geographic
areas; further, Grace can also monitor the source
of Alice and Bob’s queries (i.e. IP addresses of
phones). For example, if Grace has Bluetooth sen-
sors set up in public places, she can then trace
Alice and Bob’s geographic movements. That kind
of location trace is often sufficient to deanonymize
personal identities [23]. Alternatively, the same is
true if Bob publishes his contact tokens to Grace
and Alice queries Grace with her own tokens. Thus,
there is not perfect privacy from the authorities, but
still better than in the original TraceTogether sys-
tem, at the cost of potentially lower privacy for Bob
in the malicious model.
4.2 Ineffectiveness of Adding Spurious
Tokens for Further Anonymization
To further anonymize the polling-based system
to increase privacy from authorities, there are a
number of techniques that can be used to hide Al-
ice and Bob’s identities. Let’s begin with a sim-
ple approach—that doesn’t actually work—to give
some intuition before moving on to more effective
approaches. Consider injecting random noise by
augmenting the data with artificial tokens. When-
ever Alice and Bob send information to Grace (ei-
ther in the form of a diagnosis report or a query),
they can augment their tokens with random ones.
Note that some care has to be taken in deciding
which distribution to draw the random tokens from.
Not only should the system keep the probability of
spurious matches low, but the distributions should
also be designed to make inferences by Grace diffi-
cult.
For example, assume that Alice and Bob sam-
ple their tokens uniformly at random from {0, 1}N ,
where N is chosen to be sufficiently large that ac-
cidental collisions between individuals’ tokens are
unlikely. Suppose Bob sends to Grace his own to-
kens B upon being diagnosed, and Alice queries
Grace with all her contact tokens Aˆ. In theory,
Bob could augment his own tokens with a set of
n random tokens {ri}ni=1 drawn uniformly from
{0, 1}N , and send those to Grace as well. Un-
fortunately, N was chosen to prevent accidental
collisions; this means that the probability that the
additional random tokens correspond to the tokens
broadcast by any individual is vanishing small. But
then, there is actually little to no privacy gained.
Grace can just assume that the augmented set of
tokens correspond to Bob, and perform the same
linkage analysis that she would with only the cor-
rect set of tokens. This does nothing but pollute
Grace’s database with extra data, without affording
any real privacy gains for Bob. Similarly, Alice
also cannot obfuscate her exposure through Bob
from Grace, because any extra tokens she sends to
Grace will not change the fact that she has Bob’s
token as one of her contacts.
The root of the problem is that Grace has access
to the universe of all tokens through user queries,
and so can simply filter out all of the random tokens
generated. Thus, random noise is ineffective for
hiding information from Grace.
4.3 Enhancing Anonymity by Mixing
Different Users’ Tokens
Although introducing spurious random tokens into
the system achieves little in terms of privacy, as
discussed in the previous subsection, a slight mod-
ification of this idea leads to meaningful privacy
guarantees. The issue is that Grace has access to
the entire universe of tokens, as well as both of
the sets of tokens corresponding to Alice and Bob,
possibly augmented with random noise. Instead
of hiding true tokens with random noise, suppose
the system includes a set of M honest-but-curious
non-colluding “mixing” servers not controlled by
Grace that aggregate data before forwarding it on
to Grace.
When Bob is diagnosed with COVID-19, he par-
titions the tokens he wishes to send (depending on
the setup of the system, either his own tokens, or
those of his contacts) into M groups, and sends
each group to one of the mixing servers. The mix-
ing servers then combine Bob’s data with that of
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other users diagnosed with COVID-19 before for-
warding it onto Grace. Similarly, Alice does the
same thing for querying, except she also needs to
wait on a response from the mixing server for each
of the tokens she sends. The linkage problem then
becomes much more difficult for Grace, because
the valid tokens for individuals have been split up.
Similarly, each mixing server only has access to
a subset of the tokens corresponding to each indi-
vidual, making the linkage analysis more difficult
for them. Of course, if the mixing servers collude,
then the privacy reduces to that of the standard
polling-based approach.
Note that this approach can also be simulated
without the mixing servers by either Alice or Bob
if they have access to a large number of distinct
IP addresses. They can simply send their queries
and tokens with some time delay from the different
IP addresses, preventing Grace from linking all of
them together. However, this approach may not be
feasible for most users.
4.4 Public Database of Infected Users’
Tokens is Efficient but Less Private
Alternatively, Grace can simply publish the entire
database of tokens she receives from infected in-
dividuals, including the ones from Bob. If Alice
simply downloads the entire database, and locally
queries against it, then no information about Al-
ice’s identity is leaked to Grace.
This approach may seem less computationally
feasible, especially on mobile devices. In circum-
stances where the total number of people infected is
not very high, this approach works, as evidenced by
the South Korean model [6], though the approach
may fail as the epidemic reaches a peak. However,
the computational and transmission cost can be
partially ameliorated by batching together Grace’s
database, so that Alice is not downloading the en-
tire thing. For example, in the version where Bob
sends his own tokens B to Grace, Alice can down-
load batches corresponding to her contact tokens Aˆ.
If each batch has e.g. 50 tokens, then Grace does
not know which of those 50 tokens Alice came into
contact with.
Unfortunately, it is worth noting that this ap-
proach decreases Bob’s privacy from Alice, be-
cause Alice knows when she encountered the token
Bob sent; she can then limit the number of possible
individuals who could have sent the token based on
who she was in contact with during the time she en-
countered Bob’s token. If the token she exchanged
with Bob is present in the database, she gets a hint
as to the disease status of one of the individuals she
was in contact with during the token exchange.
5 Privacy from Authorities based on
Private Messaging Systems
None of the easy-to-implement augmentation ideas
given in Section 4 guarantee full privacy from the
authorities. At a cost of more computation, how-
ever, we believe that a solution for secure contact
tracing can be built using modern cryptographic
protocols. In particular, private messaging systems
[27; 28; 29] and private set intersection (cardinal-
ity) [30; 31; 32; 33] protocols seem especially rel-
evant. The sketch we provide below is based on
private messaging systems, though we do not claim
this to be an optimal implementation.
We will give the intuition here before going into
technical details necessary for an effective imple-
mentation. First, we replace the random tokens
(at, bt) exchanged by Alice and Bob with random
public keys (pkAt , pk
B
t ) from asymmetric encryp-
tion schemes [34]. The matching secret keys are
stored locally on each of Alice’s and Bob’s phones.
Then, imagine that Grace has established a collec-
tion of mailboxes, one for each public key that Al-
ice and Bob exchange. Additionally, we introduce
Frank and Fred. Frank forwards messages to/from
Fred. Fred forwards messages to/from Grace. They
do not tell each other the source of the messages.
At fixed time points after Bob’s contact with Al-
ice (up to some number of days), Bob addresses a
message to Alice encrypted using the public key
Alice gave Bob. Bob gives the message to Frank,
who then forwards it on to Grace (through Fred),
who puts it in Alice’s mailbox. The content of the
message is Bob’s current infection status, and the
reason he sends messages at fixed time points is
to prevent Frank from figuring out Bob’s infection
status from the fact that he is sending messages.
Alice checks all of the mailboxes corresponding to
her last several days worth of broadcasted public
keys. In one of the mailboxes, she then receives
and decrypts Bob’s message, and learns whether
she has been exposed to the virus. Grace cannot de-
crypt the message Bob sends to Alice because it is
protected by asymmetric encryption. Furthermore,
to protect Alice’s privacy, she can also access her
mailboxes through Frank and Fred, who deliver
the messages in Alice’s mailboxes to her without
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Alice
Bob
At Contact
Alice and Bob
exchange public keys
Periodically After Contact
Bluetooth
Alice
Bob
Bob sends encrypted infection
status to Alice’s mailbox
Proxy servers obfuscate
mailbox access patterns
Grace maintains mailboxes, but
cannot tell Bob sent a message to Alice
GraceProxy Servers
(Frank and Fred)
“I am (not) infected.”
Alice retrieves and decrypts
messages in mailbox        
Server 1
Server 2
Server
Figure 1: Overview of contact tracing based on private messaging systems. When Alice and Bob are near each
other they exchange public keys as tokens. They then periodically encrypt (using each other’s public key, followed
by the public keys of the proxy servers) a message indicating their infection status, and send it to the proxy server.
They also periodically query the proxy server for messages posted to the mailboxes corresponding to their public
keys to find out whether they have been exposed to the virus.
revealing which mailboxes she owns.
Contact tracing can be viewed as a problem of
secure communication between pairs of users who
came into contact in the physical world. The com-
munication patterns of who is sending messages
to whom can reveal each individuals contact his-
tory to the service provider (Grace). This notion
is known as metadata privacy leakage in computer
security [35], where the metadata associated with a
message (e.g. sender/recipient and time) is con-
sidered sensitive, in addition to the actual mes-
sage contents. In the contact tracing case, such
metadata could reveal who has been in contact
with whom, potentially revealing the users’ sen-
sitive activities. We believe that recent technical
advances [36; 27; 29] for designing scalable private
messaging systems with metadata privacy present
a promising path for developing a similar platform
for secure contact tracing.
Following recent works, our idea is to leverage
a ‘mix network [37], which is a routing protocol
that uses a chain of proxy servers (Frank/Fred)
that individually shuffle the incoming messages
before passing them onto the next server, thereby
decoupling the sender of each message from its
destination—these types of mix networks are per-
haps most well-known for being the basis of the
Onion Router/Tor anonymity network [38]. This is
a more sophisticated use of mixing servers than de-
scribed in Section 4.3 for the polling based solution.
When Bob wishes to send his encrypted message
to Alice, he first encrypts it multiple times with
public keys corresponding to each of the servers
in the mix network. Because the messages are en-
crypted in multiple layers, and each server peels
only the outermost layer, the final destination (Al-
ice’s mailbox) is revealed only to the last server,
and only Alice can read the content of the mes-
sage (i.e. infection status). To prevent Grace from
learning the identity associated with each mailbox,
Alice can also access her mailboxes through the
mix network, which shuffles the traffic to decouple
the mailboxes from their owners. As long as one
of the servers is neither breached nor controlled by
the adversary, the final message cannot be linked
to a specific sender even if the adversary has full
control of the rest of the network. Such a system
for private communication could allow the users
(Bob) to share their infection status with their re-
cent contacts (Alice) while hiding the metadata of
their contact patterns from the service providers.
The involvement of non-government entities, such
as an academic institution or a hospital, in the mix
network may help increase users trust in the system
and lower the bar for adoption.
There are several remaining issues that will
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need to be addressed for this system to be widely
adopted. First, if time-varying IDs are used, then
the user receiving a token from a nearby person
could infer the identity of the sender based on their
travel history; i.e. Alice might be able to infer who
Bob is based on the time they exchanged the tokens,
as described in Section 4.4 in the case where the
database is made public. This loss of privacy from
contacts can be partially alleviated by choosing a
less frequent token refresh, so that with high like-
lihood, Alice cannot completely identify Bob by
the time interval. Actual implementations much de-
cide on the right tradeoffs between Alice and Bob’s
privacy from eachother and authorities, as well as
contact tracing effectiveness. Another possible way
to mitigate this problem would be to aggregate the
messages for Alice on the server before making
the results available to her. The messages are en-
crypted under different public keys, but it may be
possible to use multi-key homomorphic encryption
schemes [39; 40] which allow computation over
ciphertexts encrypted with different public keys to
sum up the count of ‘infected’ messages. We defer
the details of approach to future work.
One other issue is that the volume of messages
delivered to each user may reveal how socially ac-
tive each user has been, which could be considered
sensitive by some users. Approaches to flatten the
distribution with dummy messages could allevi-
ate this concern. Flattening the distribution with
dummy messages may however lead to scalability
challenges for existing private messaging systems.
Though many techniques [36; 27; 29] have been
proposed to address this challenge, further discus-
sion among the stakeholders is needed to determine
the suitable trade-off between the level of latency
that can be tolerated and the level of privacy guar-
antees desired by the users. Ultimately, though,
private messaging systems enable provable privacy
from the authorities while still maintaining the use-
fulness of contact tracing.
6 Strategies for Encouraging
Widespread Adoption
Contact tracing apps depend on the network effect
and critical mass to work. Having the app go ‘vi-
ral’ requires that people trust the app enough to
install it and are enthusiastic enough to convince
their friends to do the same. After all, app adop-
tion must have a higher ‘transmission rate’ than the
virus itself in order for it to be effective. Providing
strong privacy guarantees would likely encourage
voluntary adoption. Any app needs to clearly ex-
plain privacy guarantees in ways understandable
by the average user, which was our motivation in
describing here the different types of privacy (from
snoopers, contacts, and the authorities) that the app
should be able to provide to users in order to earn
their trust.
On that note, we believe it is imperative for any
app to be open source and audited by both secu-
rity professionals and privacy advocates. This is
not yet true for TraceTogether, but the app’s cre-
ators do claim that they will release the source code
soon [41]. Furthermore, open sourcing allows dif-
ferent countries to customize such apps for their
particular use cases and cultural preferences.
Also, while in some countries it may be difficult
to enforce a government mandate that all residents
install an app, it is possible to have this as a require-
ment for entering certain public places. Such a prac-
tice has precedence in so-called implied consent
laws, such as agreeing to field sobriety tests when
getting a driver’s license [42]. One could imagine
grocery stores, schools, and universities requiring
installing a contact tracing app as a precondition
for entrance. This does not stop users from unin-
stalling or turning off the app off-premises, but it
would at least be useful in getting people over the
initial activation barrier of installation.
Finally, some amount of social pressure may also
assist in reaching widespread adoption. Contact
tracing apps, by design, know how many other
people close by have the app installed. An app
could display that number. Given this knowledge,
a user may be incentivized to attempt to persuade
others nearby to install the app, in the interest of
public health.
7 Discussion
In this document, we discuss ways to build an app
for contact tracing, based upon the premise that
phones can broadcast tokens to all nearby phones.
Notably, we do not address the engineering behind
applying Bluetooth to enable such a feature. Nor
do we address the possibility of location data col-
lection for assisting epidemiologists in forecasting
disease spread [43]. We also do not discuss ap-
propriate selection of token refresh interval and
frequency at which phones should poll for nearby
ones, which are important factors for balancing
privacy and efficiency—stale IDs have been seen
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to permit linkage attacks in other similar contexts
[44]. Lastly, we also do not build a full model for
privacy of contact tracing, which is a delicate and
easy-to-get-wrong task that requires much more
careful research. Instead, we focus only on the
privacy implications of a dedicated contact tracing
app, in the hopes that providing sufficiently strong
privacy guarantees would assist an app in gaining
the critical mass needed to be effective.
Note that here we only discuss direct contact trac-
ing using Bluetooth proximity networks, without
using any location data. Some indirect proposals
for contact tracing instead simply securely log the
user’s location history, which is then given to the au-
thorities if a user is diagnosed with COVID-19 [45].
This approach has the benefit of not requiring net-
work effects, because single individuals can track
their locations without needing their contacts to
have the app. The approach of logging location
history is inherently less private than direct con-
tact tracing, but that may possibly be resolved with
appropriate safeguards and redactions [45]. Fur-
thermore, hybrid approaches involving both GPS
data and Bluetooth proximity networks may prove
to be useful to public health officials in modelling
disease spread beyond just contact tracing [46].
We first discussed how, with just minor mod-
ifications, a polling-based direct contact tracing
solution allows for some anonymity from authori-
ties, which is lacking in the Singaporean Ministry
of Health app TraceTogether. We believe that this
may help an app succeed in countries such as the
U.S., where many citizens are loath to give too
much data to the government.
Even the polling-based solution still reveals quite
a bit of information to the authorities, who could
make use of linkage analysis to track individual
users. However, utilizing additional mixing servers
is relatively practical and does provide additional
protection. Alternately, a system can follow the
South Korean model of openly publishing data
about patients diagnosed with COVID-19, trading
off some of their privacy to enhance the privacy
of individuals who are trying to determine if they
have been exposed.
However, if we are willing to invest in additional
computational resources, it is possible to achieve
increased privacy from snoopers, contacts, and the
authorities, and we propose the beginnings of one
approach using private messaging systems, which
we hope will be further expanded upon in future
works. This is more computationally expensive,
but would assure users that they do not have to give
up their privacy in order to take part in public con-
tact tracing efforts. Indeed, the chief selling point
would be that they would get additional informa-
tion on their exposure without needing to trust any
individual third party with their private location or
medical information. We believe that such a guar-
antee would go a long way towards mass adoption
of a contact tracing app in the United States.
Future work remains to actually build such an
app, of course, and additional engineering, security,
and policy considerations are sure to arise. For ex-
ample, scalability of the data structures used in the
servers may become a major issue when the num-
ber of infected individuals rises. One additional
concern which we have not addressed is that of
nefarious actors seeking to spread panic by falsely
claiming to be infected. This could be prevented by
allowing only hospital workers to trigger the broad-
cast of infection status, as in Singapore’s system,
where the Ministry of Health directly contacts those
exposed, though that of course trades away some
of the privacy of diagnosed patients. Alternately,
others have proposed cryptographic verification of
contact events, which could perhaps be extended
to infection event broadcast without giving direct
access of tokens to the authorities [47]. However,
given that some cities are already rationing testing
kits and doctors’ visits to only the most serious
cases [48; 49], restricting self-reporting might re-
sult in many instances of virus spread to be missed.
Alternately, the system can also be designed to sep-
arate self-reports from confirmed reports by simply
keeping two databases.
Our goal in writing this document is to start a
conversation on (1) what kinds of privacy trade-offs
people are willing to endure for the sake of public
health, and (2) the fact that with sufficient computa-
tional resources and use of cryptographic protocols,
app-based contact tracing can be accomplished
without completely sacrificing privacy. Because
bad early design choices can persist long after roll-
out, we hope that developers and policy-makers
will give privacy considerations careful thought
when designing new contact tracing apps.
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